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Lnrren

s

upon her reading ofthree of 109 cases to
demonstrate this. (She complains that

Look aga¡n at
Stare Decisis

"Stare Decisis" does not state "exactly

which cases were used . . . to reach the
conclusions" so she cannot know how I
classified them. Had she asked, I would
have been happy to provide her with my

in Montana

full analysis of all 109 cases,)
By Jeff Renz, professor
University of Montana Law School

"2d Look" does not seriously question the rest of my methodology. More
important, Dudik fails to offer her own

Kimberly Dudik takes on "Stare
Decisis in Montapa," 65 Mont. L. Rev.
41 (2004), in the October issue of The
Montana Løwyer.t Her article is inaptly
named. It should have been entitled, "A
Cursory I ook at Stare Decisis."
In "Stare Decisis", I concluded that
from 1991-2000 the Montana Supreme
Court issued 109 opinions that overruled
precedent. This was substantially more
than previous decades. It was substan-

estimate of the Court's caseload. She
never offers an estimate of the total
cases that ovem.¡led precedent in 19912000.
Let us ignore her silence, however,
and turn to her faulty criticism.

tially more than other similar

state

supreme courts during the same decade.
I also concluded that many of those
decisions were unwaranted and others
were improper.
"2d Look" [Ms. Dudik's article] takes
issue with some of my methodology. It
questions my analysis of three cases. Its
initial argument addresses only one
small aspect of "Stare Decisis" - the
debunking of the claim that the Court's
high rate of overruling correlated to the
increase in its caseload.
"2d Look" says that a footnote in the
National Center for State Courts'report,
State Court Caseload Statistics, 2001
(from which I calculated caseload estimates for Montana and nine other state
supreme courts), declared Montana's
data incomplete. Therefore, it concludes, my estimate is unreliable. "2d
Look" also concludes, incorrectly, that I
did not include unreported orders and
non-cite opinions in my workload estimates when I conducted a decade-bydecade comparison of the Supreme

Court's caseload.
There is a simple explanation for her
complaints: She failed to read two footnotes.

Finally, "2dLook" complains that

I

have "misread" the cases. Dudik relies
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INCOMPLETE DATAORAN
INCOMPLETE F'OOTNOTE? "2d
Look" questions my use of statistics
from the National Center for State
Courts.2 I used these data to estimate
the Montana Supreme Court's caseload
during 1991-2000 and compare that estimate with estimates from nine other
states. See Stare Decisis, 65 Mont. L.
Rev. at 56. I hypothesized that ifcaseload explained the high rate ofoverruling in Montana, then we should see similar effects in other state supreme courts.
Dudik complains that a r' 'quali$ring
footnote' " in the material states that the
data are "incomplete for the state of
Montana.?' Ouch! She concludes that it
was not a good idea for me to use
incomplete data. I conclude that it is a
worse idea to use an incomplete footnote.

You see, the entire footnote says,

"The following courts? data are incomplete. . . Montana Supreme Court-Data

for 1991-2000 do not include administrative agency, advisory opinions, and
original proceedings disposed."l
Once you read the rest ofthe footnote, you discover that Montana's data
are complete. The Montana Supreme
Court reported only two categories of
appellate case filings

-

civil and crimi-

nal -- to the National Center. It also distinguished between mandatory and discretionary appeals. In reporting its data,
Montana lumped administrative agency
appeals into the civil category and so did
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not report them separately. The
Montana Supreme Court does not issue
advisory opinions and so did not report
them. Finally, our Supreme Court has
no original proceedings, and did not
report them. (You could count applications for writs of habeas corpus as original proceedings, but these are civil filings that were included in the reported
caseload.)
We can veriff the accuracy comparing the National Center's Caseload
Statistics with the Annual Report of the

Montana Judiciary (2000). OurAnnual
Report reported 868 new filings in

2000.n Caseload Statistics reported the
same figure - 868 new filings in 2000.s
"2d Look" next wonders why its
caseload totals for some states do not
jibe with mine. In reviewing the
National Center's tables, I discovered
her problem. The National Center
repofted totals hlings that the supreme
courts were required to accept (mandatory appeals) in one table and those that
they could decline (discretionary
appeals) in another. I reported the total,

ofboth tables for all such states but I
neglected to identi$z the second table in
my citation. Mea culpa. Please amend
the citation at 65 Mont. L, Rev. at 56,
n.38 to réad, "Court Statistics Projeci,
State Court Caseload Statistics, 2001,
Table 13, 176-l78,Table 14, 186-187
(National Center on State Courts 20Ol).Why "2d Look" failed to diagnose this, I
do not know. It wasn't difficult.
"2d Look" next considers my comparison of Montana Supreme Courts
past and present. I hypothesized that if
the rate ofoverruling correlated to case
load, theri'we should see similar correlation in earlier decades.
"2d Look's" investigation came
across this statement with respect to the
Court's caseload during I 89 l-2000:
"During the 1990s the Montana
Supreme Court issued more unreported
orders and 'non-cite'opinions than it
had in the past. I have not included
these in the total case load for any
decade. . . ."6 Dudik says this "glaring
flaw," 2d Look at l0, "makes a substantial difference in base number data for
the 1991-2000 decade." 1d. Presumably
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this means I would alter my conclusion
that the Montana Supreme Court overruled 23.5 cases per 1,000 cases during

my comment in "Stare Decisis:" "While
some readers may disagree with my categorization ofa given case, I believe

1991-2000.'

that the patterns that I set forth here are
accurate,"e 2d Look does not address
the pattems. So I will not rebut 2d
Look's analysis of Bush v. Montana
Department of Justiceto or State v.

Unfortunately, "2d Look" misreads a
footnote again.
"2d Look"'s eÍïor appears in footnote
42. "Unreported" modifies both orders
and non-cite opinions. That is, to arrive
at my the total case load ("2d Look"
refers to this as "base numbers"), I
counted every-decision reported on
Westlaw during the decades set out in
Table 3 and Figure 3, whether they were
non-cile opinions or not. I did not count
those that were not reported on Westlaw.
My method favors the Court more than
2d Look's adjustment.s Dudik counts
opinions. I counted reported decisions
because decisions are more reflective of
the Courtls caseload. In other words, I

included all the opinions that Dudik
thought I exclude$ and I also included
other orders and iiecisions for which
opinions were written but not published.
Using 2d Look's methodology, the ratg
of overruling for I 991-2000 increases
from 23.5 case per 1,000 to 26 cases per

Helfrich" because I discuss those case5
in j'Stare Decisis."r2 I do, however, want
to talk about State v. Staqtt3 because it
illustrates my point about opportunistic
overruling and I did not discuss it in
"Stare Decisis."
^S/øat

address ed State v. McPherson.tn

McPherson had held that polygraphs are
inadmissible as evidence but held that
the defendant could not complain about
the admission of a polygraph at his sentencing because he invited the error by
offering the result.15 S¡øal also held
thát polygraph results are inadmissible
as evidence al trial and,ovemrled
McPherson, "[t]o the extent that it'is
inconsistent with this order. . . ."'n
Confused? You should be. ^Slaa¡ illustrates one of the problems with the
Court's jurisprudence:' McPherson and

&qat afüculated the identical rule but
the Court overrules the earlier çase simply because the appellant tried to stretch
it to fit his circumstance,
"2d Look" explains that Staat's over-

ruling language "clarified" case law.

If

so, when in the future a defendant offers
a polygraph result, the trialjudge erroneously admits it, the defendant is convicted, and he appeals and complains
about the admissión of the polygraph,
what result? Does Slaaf mean that
admission of the polygraph is now
reversible error, regardless ofwho offers
it? Or does .S/aar preserve McPherson's
holding that the dèfendant cannot complain if he offered the evidence? That
does not seem like a clariflrcation to me.

CONCLUSION. The author of "2d
Look" needs to read footnotes more
closely, needs to tead statistical reports
more carefully, and needs to read case
law with a more critical eye. "2d Look"
should have taken a 3d Look.

NOTES
1 . "A 2d Look

at Stare Dec¡s¡s statistics,' 30

1,000.

"2d Look" again misreads a footnote
and its error results from that misreading. The rate of overruling for l99l2000,23.5 cases per 1,000 decisions, is
valid. It is and remains, as Ms. Dudik
states, "an astonishing and implausible
change" compared to earlier decades.
In the final analysis, 2d Look's critique of my statistical methods results in
one correction - a corrected pinpoint
citation to State Court Caseload
Statistics. But there is one more observation to be made about data: Where
are 2d Look's data that demonstrate that
the Montana Supreme Court was not
overruling at a high rate, compared to
similar state courts and compared to past
Montana Supreme Courts? "2d Look"
doesn't offer it and that phenomenon is
neither astonishing nor implausible,
IS IT CLARIFICATION OR IS IT
NEWSPEAK? Next, "2d Look" claims
"superflrcial Legal Analysis." Actually
what it says is that "overrule" does not
mean "oveffule." Overrule, we learn as
we read 2d Look's analysis, actually
means to "clarifu" or to "resolve situations." This is Newspeak.
2d Look's case analysis brings us to
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Montana Lawyer

l0

(October 2004).

9.

2.

Court Statist¡cs Projecl, State Court Caseload
Statistics, 2001, Table 13,176-178, Table 14, 186187 (Nat¡onal Center on State Courts 2001).

3.

Court Stat¡stics Proiect, State Court Caseload
Statistics, 2001, 180 n.A (National Center on State
Courts 2001) (emphasis in original).

4. Annual Report at

Court Statistics Project, State Court Caseload
Statistics, 2001, Table 13,176-179, Table 14, 186'
187 (National Center on State Courts 2001).2

6. See Stare Decisis,65 Mont, L. Rev. at 58'59 &
n.42.
7.

See, Stare Decisis, 65 Mont. L. Rev. at 58'

8.

See 2d Look, 30 Montana Lawyer at 11.
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10. 1998 MT 270,291 Mont. 359, 968 P2d 716.
11. 277 Mo¡|.452,922 P.2d 1159 (1996).
12. 65 Mont. L. Rev. at 74-75.

13. 248 Mont. 291,811 P.zd 1261 (1991).

15. McPherson, 236 Mont. at 491-492; 771 P.zd al
125.

16. Staat,248 Mont. a|292,811 P.2daI1262.

Kìmberly Dudìk replies:
Professor Jeffrey Renz, the author of
Stare Decicis in Montqna, 65 Mont. L.
Rev. 4l (lltinter 2004), appears to extend
his criticism of the Montøna Supreme
Court to qnyone who dares question his
writing qnd research abilities.
Unfortunately for readers, he fails to
clarify whether his original study and
the methodology he employed were
accurate.
The numbers Professor Renz [hereinafter the authorl utilized are still unreliqble and his case ønalysis is still
incomplete ; cons equently, his article
"Stare Decicis in Montanq" [hereinafter
" Stare Decisis " J remains misleading.
In "Look Again at Stare Decisis in
Montana," the author now claims that
what he meant infootnote 42 of Stare
Decisis, 65 Mont. L. Rev. at 58, is not

what thefootnote clearly states. The
author contends he actually included
noncite opinions in the base court cqseload numbers for the Stare Decisis
study. Howeve4 the ambiguous language of the footnote's first sentence and

plain meaning of the second sentence lead readers to a different conclusion.
Fooînote 42 infull:states: "During
the 1990s, lhe Montana Supreme Court
issued more unreported orders and
'non-cite'opinions than it had in the
past. I have not included these in the
total caseloadfor any decade because
the court deliberately treated them as
the

non-precedential." Curiously,
€ tost e

Dillon MT

the

author criticizes for not reading the
entire þotnole but then fails to repro-

PO Box 1031 . I South ldaho,

Suite C

59725

1-800-237-1031

E-mail: aeei@ircl.031.x,com
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adj ect iv

14. 236 Mont. 484,771 P.2d 120 (1989).

8.

5.

¡
.

however, would lead one to believe the
65 Mont. L. Rev at 64.

duce thefootnote in its entirety.
' The author claims that the word
"unreported" modified both the word
"orders" and the phrase "non-cite opinions." A plain reading ofthe phrase,

THr Monr,rNA

LAWYER

e

"

unrep or t ed " w ould mo

difi

noun

the immediately þllowing
"orders" and the adiective "non-cite"
would modify the noun "opinions." If
the footnote actually means that the
author "counted every decision reported
on Westlqw during the decades set out in
Table 3 and Figure 3, whether they were

non-cite opinions or not [but] did not
count those that were not reported on
Westlaw[,] " he should have clearly stated this because the meaning is very dif'
ferentfrom how thefootnote reads.
Theþotnote should have been more
precisely written because as written it is
ambiguous; it reads that he did not
include the noncite opinions in his bqse
caseload for the Court. Readers would
rationally conclude that an article writ-

ten by a law professor would not be
ambiguous, would be accurately footnoted, and would include a telephone number (perhaps in anotherfootnote) if
phoning the author for clørity was
required as the author suggests in "Look

Again."
Additionally, to stqte that he included
"reported" noncite opinions but not

¡'unreported" noncite opinions drqws q
false distinction between unreported and
reported noncite cases. First, no dffirence exists between "reported" and
"unreported" noncitè opinions - they
are all non-precedential and all reported
in the samefashion. Second, because
the stated reqson in "Stare Decisis" for
not including the unreported orde¡s and
noncite opinions was thqt "the còurt
deliberately treated them as non-precedential, " it seems strange thal he would
include "reported" noncite opinions
since all noncite opinions qre non-precedential (which is why he stated in the
footnote he did not include them).
Nonetheless, if this is what was done it
should have been clearly and succinctly
explained in his original article.
The authorfails to provide any evidence that the methodologt employed
and the numbers utilized provided a stqtisticatty qccurqte represenlation of the
rate at which the Court overruled precedent. The purpose of my article, "A 2nd
Look at Stare Decisis Statistics," The
Montqna Løwyer, I0-12 (Oct. 2004)
[hereinafter "A 2nd Look"], was to
illustrate that the numbers "Stare

NoveivseR.2004

Decisis" usedwere unreliable; the purpose wqs not to produce q new study or
provide numbers to be incorporated into
the "Stare Decisis" study. The conclusion that there would be a higher rate of
overruling ifdatafrom "A 2nd Look"
was incorporated into the "Stare
Decisis" study is inaccurqte because
any numbers provided in "A 2nd Look"
were not gatheredfor those purposes
and are unsuitablefor such use. As stated in "A 2nd Look," the numbers were
an (nerqge of the number of noncite
opinions released everyyear. The numbers provided were not to calculate the
Court's caseloqd or the rate qt which the
Court wss acting; the numbers were
provided to illustrate thqt the methodologt in "Stare Decisis" was incomplete

andfløwed.
The clarificatíon thqt base court cqseload numbers (whichwere utilized by
the quthor to compare Montanq to nine.
other states) were gatheùdfrom two
tables (not one, as originally cited)'in
the National Center

for State Courts'

report, State Court Caseload Statistics,
2001, to ueate the numbers exhìbited
þr comparison of the base court caseload does not prove that the comparison
wqs accurqte. Additionally, the circular
argument thqt qhho,ugh the numbers for

Montana were incomplete, they were
nonetheless complete is unconv incing
qnd does not verify the reliability of the
numbers he utilized.
If the author had fully read all quali-

fuingfootnotes provided in the National
Center þr State Courts'report (not only
for Montana but also for the states he
compared Montanq with) he would have
learned that the numbers provided were
"incomplete" (for Montana) ; " incomplele and overinclusive" (for Maine and
South Døkota) ; " overinclus¡r"t' (for
Delaware); and the data includedfor
the different states wqs greatly varied.
Although he prefers to blame the reader
for not deciphering what he really meant
or what data he really used (when his
article clearly slqtes otherwise), the
results he obtqined are still doubtful
because qn accurate comparison is
impossible given the variances between
the dffirent states. It is never expløined
how these dffirences qmongst the states
allowfor qn accurate comparison.
The author fails to recognize that further analysis of the many cqses he cìted
øs overruling precedent is necessqry
before any accurate claim can be made
of the ffict these cases had on case

precedent. A thorough review of a small
sampling of the 109 cases he claimed

Coming Friday, Dec. 10, 2004

Family Law Update CLE
By the CLE lnstitute of the State Bar of Montana

overruled precedent indicates that his
conclusion is not valid. Additionally, the
brief analysis he provides of State v.
Staat (1991), 248 Mont. 291, 8ll P.2d
1 26 1 , further shows that this case does
not høve the ffict of overruling case
precedent as he claimed it did (it sctuallyfollows decades of case precedent).
To summarize, the methodologt utilized in "Stare Decisis" hqs not been
proven qccurqte. No evidence has been
pro duce d w hi ch s hows the m et ho dol ogt

provided a statistically reliable picture
of the Montana Supreme Court's actions,
especially as these aclions compare to
other stqtes. The authorfails to prove
that the cases he clqimed overruled
precedent actually had this effect. Until
a criticql and thorough analysis ofall
the cases is provided, the true rate at
which the Montana Supreme Court overruled precedent in the 1991-2000
decade will not be known.
Perhaps if the author takes his own
advice to heqrt and reads footnotes and
stqtistical reports more closely qnd carefully, reads case law with a more critical
eye, and writes more precisely, no one
will be forced to take a second or third
look to ascertain the validity, accurqcy,
or meaning of his words.
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